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Abstract 
 
This paper quantifies the effect of GMO regulation on bilateral trade flows of agricultural 
products. We develop a composite index of GMO regulations and using a gravity model we 
show that bilateral differences in GMO regulation negatively affect trade flows. This effect is 
especially driven by labeling, approval process and traceability. Our results are robust to the 
endogeneity of GMO standards to trade flows.  
 
JEL: F13, F14, Q13, Q18, Q17 
Keywords: GMO Standards, Harmonization, Trade Flows, Gravity Model, Endogeneity 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Public policies on genetically modified organisms (GMO) differ strongly across countries 
and regions, resulting in a market fragmentation that currently challenges the international 
trading regime (Isaac et al., 2004). Several authors have pointed out that the stringency 
of GMO regulations of important agri-food importers like the European Union (EU) and 
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Japan, in contraposition with the ‘soft’ GMO regulations of exporters like the US and 
Argentina, can represent a serious problem for developing countries’ strategies in 
deciding GMO production and regulation (e.g. Tothova and Oehmke, 2004; Anderson 
and Jackson, 2004; Anderson, 2010). Indeed, while the potential gains from GMO 
adoption appear particularly high for several Asian and African countries (Huang et al. 
2004; Anderson, 2005; Smale et al., 2009; Gruère et al., 2009a), developing countries 
also face the potential loss of access to rich markets with strong consumer opposition to 
GMOs. 
Formal evidence on the trade effects of GMO regulations is rare and often 
inconclusive. Empirically investigating this issue is difficult, because there are no 
comparable measures of GMO standards. Thus, the first aim of this paper is to create such 
a measure. Specifically, the paper develops a composite index on the stringency of GMO 
regulations for a sample of sixty countries. We use this index to study how 
similarity/dissimilarity in GMO regulations affects bilateral trade flows. The composite 
nature of our index allow us to analyze both the overall trade effect of the GMO 
regulation, as well as the partial effects induced by each component of the GMO 
regulation, like the approval process, labeling and so on. 
The paper adds to the existing literature in three ways. First, we study the trade effect 
of GMO regulations using an ‘objective’ multidimensional index of GMO standards and 
its components, in order to shed light on the regulatory dimensions that matter most for 
trade flows. Thus, we depart from the standard approach of using simple dummy variables 
to capture the trade effect of GMO regulation as, for example, in Disdier and Fontagnè 
(2010).1 Second, we focus on harmonization or differences in standards instead of on the 
more traditional question of the trade reduction effect induced by the stringency in GMO 
regulations. Indeed, we try to answer a slightly different question: how much does 
similarity/dissimilarity in GMO regulation between exporting and importing countries 
affect bilateral trade in GMO related products? This question appears to be more relevant 
in understanding the actual effect of GMO regulations or standards in general. 
                                                 
1
 Obviously, this does not mean that using a dummy for capturing the trade effect of GMO is a priori less 
interesting. Indeed, the last approach has the advantage of exploiting the time dimension, strengthening 
econometric identification. Of course, the best strategy also depends on the research question and/or data 
availability. However, it is clear that if we want to understand which GMO regulatory dimension matters 
the most for trade flows, then one needs to go beyond a simple categorization based on dummy variables. 
Gruère et al. (2009a) represent an example in that direction; however they limited the investigation to GMO 
labeling policies. 
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Our final contribution is the attempt to account for potential bias induced by the 
endogeneity of GMO standards to trade flows, an issue mostly ignored in existing 
empirical studies.2 Indeed, political economy studies (see Anderson and Jackson, 2004; 
Gruère et al. 2009a; Swinnen and Vandemoortele, 2011) suggest that GMO regulations 
are endogenous to trade flows. 
This paper is related to several other studies. Particularly relevant for our analysis are 
the studies of Cadot et al. (2001), Parcell and Kalaitzandonakes (2004), Disdier and 
Fontagné (2010), Tothova and Oehmke (2004), Veyssiere (2007), and Gruère et al. 
(2009a).3 Cadot et al. (2001) find that the ‘regulatory protectionism’ aspect of the EU 
GMO regulation has no repercussions on US export of corn seeds, but has a negative 
effect on other forms of corn. Downstream traders’ and food retailers’ private decisions 
not to purchase GM products were more important than cultivation bans. Parcell and 
Kalaitzandonakes (2004) did not find any relevant effect on future prices after major food 
companies announced a voluntary ban on purchasing GM crops. More recently, Disdier 
and Fontagné (2010) used a gravity equation to estimate the effects of the EU de facto 
moratorium on GMOs. They show that the EU moratorium, as well as other European 
GMO standards, has negative trade effects on the exporting countries.  
Tothova and Oehmke (2004) develop a Krugman-style trade model to study the 
endogenous choice of different countries in setting GMO standards, showing the 
formation of ‘clubs’ of countries that share similar GMO regulations. These ‘clubs’ act 
as sub-global preferential trading agreements. Their model suggests the formation of two 
trading blocs, one in favor, the other against GMOs. In between, there emerges a third 
group of countries that face a choice between lower production costs (through the 
adoption of GM crops) and the maintenance of an export market by restricting GMO 
production. Veyssiere (2007), also studied the dilemma faced by exporting countries 
whether or not to approve GM products, finding that GM product approval is optimal 
under a labeling regime, whereas non-approval is optimal in the absence of mandatory 
                                                 
2
 To date, in the gravity literature concerning the trade effect of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), the problem of 
endogeneity of NTBs to trade flows has rarely been taken into account. Exceptions can be found in 
Shepherd (2007), Olper and Raimondi (2008) and Djankov et al. (2010).  
3
 Others related important studies are the ones from Lapan and Moschini (2004) and Smyth et al. (2006). 
The former shows that GMO labeling can redistribute income among trading nations, and can benefit the 
importing country. Differently Smyth et al. (2006) show that trade patterns of GMO products displayed 
changes after the introduction of GMO regulations. See also Runge and Jackson (2000), Fulton and 
Giannakas (2004) for GMO labeling issues, and Gruère (2006) for an overview of worldwide GMO 
regulatory systems. 
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labeling. Finally, Gruère et al. (2009a) adopt a political economy approach to evaluate 
the importance of socio-economic factors in the selection of GM labeling regulations. 
They show, both theoretically and empirically, that production and trade interests play an 
important role in GM labeling choices. In particular, in developing countries, regional 
influences and trade factors may be more important than domestic consumer preferences 
or anti-GMO campaigns. Clearly, these studies suggest that GMO regulations are 
potentially endogenous to trade flows. 
Our paper is also related to an emerging literature showing that harmonization of 
standards is important for international trade. For example, de Frahan and Vancauteren 
(2006), Moenius (2006), Czubala et al. (2009) and Shepherd (2007), find that 
international standards have a smaller impact on trade than unilateral standards. Indeed, 
harmonization may limit costs thanks to the substitution of multiple national or regional 
standards with a single unified international standard. Moreover, if the domestic standard 
is similar to the foreign one, producers have already coped with the cost of compliance 
and export costs are lower. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section (2) explains how we constructed 
the GMO regulatory index. Section (3) presents the empirical model and discusses the 
data and the countries used in the empirical exercise. Section (4) presents and discusses 
the econometric results. Finally, section (5) provides conclusions and implications.  
  
2. An index of GMO regulation 
 
2.1 Sample, data and computational strategy4  
 
We create a GMO regulation index for 60 countries for which it was possible to collect 
information on laws and acts regulating GMO cultivation and commercialization. We 
collected information on GMO regulations until June 2008. The index thus reflects GMO 
regulations in place in 2007, or before. However, it is important to keep in mind that, 
especially for developing countries, there could be significant delays in the enforcement 
of the regulations, due to political and technical reasons. This may cause a slightly upward 
bias of the index for some developing countries.  
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 An online Appendix provides an in-depth description and justification of the characteristics and economic 
impact of each regulatory dimension, composing the GMO index described in the text. 
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The criteria for the countries selection was the availability of information on laws and 
acts on GMO cultivation and commercialization. Figure 1 gives the full list of the 
considered countries. The main information source used to classify the GMO regulations 
are the Global Agriculture Information Network (GAIN) reports on biotechnology 
provided by the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA). For missing information we referred to official national acts and 
reports. 
The country sample includes most of the OECD members and non-OECD important 
exporters of agricultural products The countries in the sample produce more than the 80%, 
95%, 60% and 66% of global maize, soybean, rapeseed and cotton, respectively.5 Six 
different components of the GMO regulation were considered, namely approval process, 
risk assessment, labeling, traceability, coexistence and membership in international GMO 
agreements. Each component was scored with values ranging from 0 (first condition) to 
the total number of sub-components identified for each category (see Table 1). Higher 
scores correspond to more restrictive regulations. For those countries that declare 
themselves ‘GM-free’ (e.g. Zambia and Zimbabwe), meaning that no GM products can 
be domestically cultivated or introduced, we assigned the highest score. On the contrary, 
the lower score is assigned where no rules have been adopted. For the approval process, 
the restrictiveness increases with the adoption of the precautionary principle rather than 
the principle of substantial equivalence. For example, the approval process of the US 
follows the principle of substantial equivalence, while the EU Members adopt the 
precautionary principle. The restrictiveness of the risk assessment has been evaluated on 
the degree of its implementation. Only a few countries do not have rules for risk 
assessment (e.g. Bangladesh and Ukraine), while the countries with risk assessment rules, 
but not yet enforced, are mainly developing countries (e.g. Kenya, Peru and Sri Lanka). 
The labeling restrictiveness captures voluntary versus mandatory, as well as the threshold 
level. For example, labeling restrictiveness increases from countries as India and 
Bangladesh, where there are no enforced GMO labels, over countries with voluntary 
labeling (Argentina, Canada and US), to countries with mandatory labeling with a 
threshold higher than 1% (e.g. Japan, Korea and Russia ) or equal or lower than 1% (EU 
Members). With respect to traceability, the score increases from identity preservation (IP) 
                                                 
5
 Authors’ computation based on FAOSTAT data:  http://faostat.fao.org/site/567/default.aspx#ancor  
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to traceability, given the greater complexity and the higher compliance costs of the latter. 
Many exporter countries do not have any GMO traceability requirements (e.g. Argentina, 
China, Hong Kong, and India) or only IP (e.g. Australia and US). In contrast, GMO 
traceability is compulsory in many importers (e.g. EU Members and Japan). In our 
scoring method, the coexistence burden increases with the complexity of the requirements 
in national guidelines. Most of the countries in the sample do not have coexistence rules 
(e.g. Brazil, Canada, China), others have partial (Argentina, Finland, New Zealand) or 
comprehensive (Japan and EU) coexistence guidelines.  
The international regulatory framework starts at World Trade Organization (WTO) 
level, where GMO standards fall under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement 
that aims to reduce the protectionist bias of food standards in general. Given the 
specificity of GMO products, two more GMO specific international agreements are 
considered in the category ‘membership in international GMO agreements’, namely the 
Cartagena Protocol and the Codex Alimentarius (see the Web-appendix for details). In 
this category the score increases with the number of agreements to which the country 
subscribed. Note that only Hong Kong and Taiwan are not members of either of the 
agreements, while all the other countries are members of at least one agreement. 
Some categories are strongly related to each other. For example, in many regulations 
an approval process cannot be conducted without a product risk assessment. However, 
this logic does not systematically apply to the GMO standards context. An analysis of the 
regulation of the 60 countries suggests many unexpected and ambiguous stages of 
implementation. For example, there are countries with a voluntary labeling regime but 
with no required traceability or segregation system (e.g. Canada). 
The final GMO index is obtained by the summation of scores of each category and, 
after normalization, has a value between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate a more 
restrictive regulation on GMO production, commercialization and trade.6 
An overview of the GMO index ranking and score is given in Figure 1. Several 
interesting patterns emerge. First, as expected, the index documents the well known 
polarization between the US and the EU. The former has a GMO regulatory index of 0.35, 
which contrasts with the EU average of 0.69. Secondly, with the exception of GM-free 
                                                 
6
 Our GMO index is built on the overall regulation without distinctions among products. However, a 
national GMO regulation may require different measures for different products. For example, in the EU 
coexistence is related to the cultivation of maize, given that it is the only GM crop approved. 
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countries, developing countries tend to be in the low part of the ranking. All the 
considered EU countries, as well as Asian food importers like Japan (but not South 
Korea), display a high GMO index. However, it is interesting to note that also within the 
EU there exist some differences in the GMO rules.7 For example, the highest score of 
0.75 was found in Austria and Italy that have imposed a ban on the cultivation of EU 
approved GMO maize. Spain and Germany have significantly lower scores, equal to 0.60 
and 0.65, respectively. 
Stringent regulations generally require more costly procedures for exporters, and 
comprehensive policies can have a greater trade effect. It is assumed that approval 
procedures are fixed costs, while traceability and labeling are variable costs, influencing 
present and future GM and non-GM crop exports (see Gruère, 2006). 
 
3. GMO standards and international trade  
 
3.1 Empirical model and estimation strategy 
In this section we present our strategy in assessing the potential trade effect of GMO 
regulations. The bilateral trade equation is derived from the standard constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) monopolistic competition trade model, with increasing returns to 
scale and iceberg trade costs, introduced by Krugman (1980). In the empirical version of 
the model the bilateral trade flow from j to i in product k (Mijk) can be summarized by the 
following log-linear bilateral trade equation: 
                     ijkijijkijijijk uDM  Z)1ln(lnln 210             (1) 
where j and i are the exporter and importer fixed effects controlling for the size terms 
as well as for unobserved number of varieties (firms) and price terms of the exporter, and 
for expenditure and unobserved price terms of the importer, respectively. Dij is the 
transport cost proxied by distance between i and j, while ijk is the ad valorem bilateral 
                                                 
7
 The EU produced four main acts to regulate plant biotechnology and its products: Dir. 2001/18/EC on the 
deliberate release into the environment of GMO; Reg. 1829/2003/EC and 1830/2003/EC on the traceability 
and labeling of GM products, and Recommendation 2003/556/EC on coexistence. The source of different 
levels of stringency across Member States is mainly in the coexistence regulation. Given the not-binding 
force of the Recommendation, compared with the compulsory nature of Regulations and Directives, each 
Member State has greater freedom in deciding coexistence requirements. Moreover, delays in the 
transposition of the EU acts in domestic laws, may induce further differences in the effective restrictiveness 
of GMO regulations. 
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tariff on product k. Zij is a vector of any other bilateral trade cost different from distance 
and tariffs and, finally, uijk  is an error term. The parameters 1, 2, and  are the 
coefficients to be estimated. 
We augment this basic gravity equation by introducing a variable measuring bilateral 
differences in GMO regulatory indexes in the vector of other trade costs, Zij. We 
computed two different GMO bilateral variables. The first is obtained by taking the 
absolute deviation of the GMO index across country pairs, namely GMOij = GMOi – 
GMOj. An advantage of this bilateral measure, other than its simplicity and its 
transparency, is that it is easily computable for each regulatory component. The GMOij 
bilateral index increases in the level of dissimilarity (or distance) in GMO regulations 
across country pairs or, put differently, it represents an inverse index of ‘harmonization’ 
in GMO regulations. 
In order to test the robustness of our findings, we also used a second index called 
GMOwij, following Anderson (2009) and Jaffe (1986). This second index can be defined 
as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) 21
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Where fim (fjm) is the ratio between the regulatory component score attributed to country i 
(j) on the highest score assigned to the component m. This allows a degree of bilateral 
regulatory ‘closeness’ between two countries, ranging between 0 (completely different) 
and 1 (identical regulation). Jaffe (1989) indicates that the proximity measure is 0 for 
countries whose vectors are orthogonal and 1 for countries whose position vectors are 
identical.8 Finally, note that, given the definition of our bilateral variables, they should 
display opposite coefficient signs in the regression results, GMOwij being a similarity 
index, while GMOij is a dissimilarity index. Indeed, the correlation coefficient between 
them is negative and equal to 0.60. 
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 In practice, this index defines vectors of national rationed scores, named fi  =  ( fi1,…, fiM) with M =  6, which locates 
country i in the M-dimensional space. Similarity of the regulation can be computed through the proximity of the f-
vectors, defined by the cosine of the angle between them. 
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With regard to the estimation method, as equation (1) is applied to disaggregated trade 
data (our regressions are always run at the HS 6-digit level) the first problem is the large 
number of zero bilateral trade flows. One of the most common methods to deal with zero 
trade is the Heckman (1979) two stage selection correction: i) a Probit equation where all 
trade flows determinants are regressed on the indicator variable, Tij, equal to 1 when j 
exports to i
  
and 0 otherwise; ii) an OLS second-stage with the same regressors as the 
Probit equation, plus the inverse Mills ratio from the first stage, correcting for the bias 
generated by the sample selection problem. Following the modification suggested in 
Helpman et al. (2008) and supported by Martin and Pham (2008), we omitted an 
independent variable associated with the fixed trade costs in the second OLS stage.9 
Furthermore, to check for robustness of the Heckman selection procedure, we used a 
modified Poisson fixed-effects estimation, namely the zero-inflated negative binomial 
model (ZINB), which accounts for the possible bias created by the logarithmic 
transformation (Jensen’s inequality) and the failure of the homoskedasticity assumption.10  
Moreover, as in previous studies (i.e. Disdier and Fontagné, 2010), we face an 
identification problem, because it is not possible to distinguish between  GMO and non-
GMO traded products. As a consequence, a reduction in trade flows can only partially be 
attributed to GMO regulations. In order to deal with this issue, in the specification of the 
gravity equation we consider also other potential determinants of trade flows different 
from GMO standards, like tariffs. The inclusion of bilateral tariffs in the trade cost 
function is important because if our bilateral GMO index is positively correlated to 
bilateral tariffs, then omitting tariffs can result in an overestimation of the GMO effect on 
trade flows.11  
Finally, as discussed in the introduction, a relevant concern about the estimation 
strategy of the gravity equation (1) is related to the possibility that GMO regulations are 
endogenous to trade flows. For this reason, in the empirical analysis we also check the 
                                                 
9
 The underlying idea is that fixed trade costs, here proxied by the language dummy, affect the probability to export. 
Thus, the language dummy is included only in the (first stage) selection equation, but not in the OLS equation (see 
Martin and Pham, 2008). 
10
 As pointed out by Burger et al. (2009), the ZINB considers the existence of two latent groups within the population: 
the first with strictly zero counts, the second with a non-zero probability of observing positive trade flows. The ZINB 
model is estimated in two steps: first a Probit regression of the probability that there is no bilateral trade; a second 
(Negative Binomial) Poisson regression of the probability of each count for the group that has a non-zero probability 
(see Burger et al. 2009). 
11
 The correlation between tariffs and NTBs is an empirical question. To date, considerable evidence of a positive 
correlation for agri-food products can be found in Kee et al. (2009). In our sample, running a fixed effect regression of 
tariffs on the GMO index, the coefficient of tariffs is positive and strongly significant. 
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robustness of our main findings for possible bias due to the endogeneity of GMO 
standards.   
3.2 Data  
To study the effect of GMO standards on trade flows we consider the trade data of three 
major potential GM products: maize, soybean and rapeseed, for both human and animal 
consumption. We also include cotton products related to the agri-food channel, in 
particular seeds, oils and cake for animal fodder or as feed ingredients. Trade data come 
from the Commodity Trade database of the United Nations Statistical Division (UN-
COMTRADE). We work at the 6-digit level of the 2002 Harmonized System (HS 2002) 
classification. Because it is not possible to distinguish between GMO and non-GMO 
products, we consider those products recognized in the literature as potentially genetically 
modified.  
In the empirical analysis, we start considering all the HS 6-digit headings related to 
the four potential GMO products taken together, in order to assess the overall impact of 
the GMO standards on trade. Second, we also consider each group of products separately, 
in order to distinguish specific regulatory effects on maize, soybean, rapeseed and cotton. 
The four groups of HS 6-digit headings are called, for simplicity, Maize, Soybean, 
Rapeseed, and Cotton.12 
The country sample is selected using the following rules. First, we considered 
importing and exporting countries covered by our GMO index. Next, in order to ensure 
the presence of bilateral trade flow, we checked that all the exporting countries are 
exporters and/or producers of at least one of the four products considered. Production data 
comes from FAOSTAT.  
The time period considered covers the average trade flows over three years: 2005, 
2006 and 2007.13 Despite the GMO adoption started in the late nineties, it is only in recent 
years that we have witnessed an acceleration of the diffusion of GMO regulation. This 
can be attributed not only to the growing amount of GMOs traded, but also to the 
                                                 
12
 The HS 2002 (6-digit) headings used are as follow. Maize: 071040, 100510, 100590, 110220, 110313, 110320, 
110423, 110812, 151521, 151529, 190410, 190420, 200580, 230210, 230310; Soybean: 120100, 120810, 150710, 
150790, 210310, 210610, 230400; Rapeseed: 120510, 120590, 151411, 151419, 151491, 151499, 230649; Cotton: 
120720, 151221, 151229, 230610. 
13
 For practical reasons, we do not extend the sample period to 2008, to eliminate the possible confounding effect due 
to the financial crisis export slow down.  
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international trade controversy that has led to the definition of GMO import and export 
rules.  
Finally, regarding the other standard covariates used in the gravity equation, like 
distance, and dummies for other trade costs (contiguity, language, and colony) they are 
taken from CEPII (Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales). 
Differently, bilateral tariffs are obtained from the MAcMap database (Bouët et al., 2008) 
jointly developed by ITC (UNCTAD and WTO, Geneva) and CEPII (Paris). MAcMap 
includes ad-valorem, as well as specific components of each bilateral tariff line at the HS 
6-digit level. Thus no tariff aggregation was needed in the empirical model. Moreover, 
the original methodology used by the MAcMap database to aggregate tariffs (a weighting 
scheme based on reference group of countries) limits the extent of the endogeneity bias 
of tariffs.  
Table 2 provides summary statistics of variables used in the empirical model. 
 
4. Results  
 
In this section the results of the econometric estimation of equation (1) are reported and 
discussed. First we focus on the assumption that the two bilateral measures of the GMO 
index are exogenous variables. Then we check the robustness of the results by considering 
the potential endogeneity.14  
Table 3 reports results pooling the data across the four groups of products and 
considering four different estimators: a simple OLS on positive trade, the first stage Probit 
of the Heckman selection procedure and its second OLS stage and, finally, the ZINB 
estimator. Starting from standard gravity covariates, the distance coefficient is always 
negative and significant. The common border and colony dummies are positive and 
significant, with the exception of colony in the OLS specification where it has a negative, 
but not significant, effect. As expected, bilateral tariffs have a negative and significant 
effect on bilateral trade flows. If we give a structural interpretation to the tariff coefficient, 
equal to (1 –  ) with   > 1 representing the elasticity of substitution between varieties, 
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 We follow this strategy for both comparability and practical reasons. Indeed, almost all previous papers have 
considered GMO regulations as an exogenous variable. Moreover, it is well known that finding good instruments of 
such a variable is quite a difficult task in a gravity environment (more on this below). 
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then we have an estimate of such elasticity. Its average value, around 3, is of the same 
order of magnitude as recent estimates reported by Raimondi and Olper (2011). 
Moving to the variable of interest, columns 1 to 4 consider the dissimilarity index, 
GMOij. Across all estimators, it has a negative and strongly significant coefficient (p-
value < 0.01).15 Because the index measures the distance in GMO regulations across 
countries, a negative coefficient means that bilateral trade flow is increasing in the 
similarity of GMO regulation. The (absolute) magnitude of the estimated effect increases 
from 1.18 to 1.65 on passing from the OLS to the II stage Heckman, suggesting that 
selection bias can be a problem, a conclusion confirmed by the high significant level of 
the Mills ratio. It is interesting to note that also the GMOij coefficient of the first stage 
Probit regression is significantly negative (see Column 2), suggesting that distance in the 
GMO regulation negatively affects also the probability of positive trade, namely its 
extensive margin. 
In order to check for robustness in the Heckman procedure for the treatment of zeros, 
column (4) reports the ZINB estimator, validated by the over-dispersion and Vuong 
tests.16 Once again the effect is negative and strongly significant. However, the estimated 
coefficient is lower in magnitude.  
Columns 5 to 8 run the same specifications but using the similarity index, GMOwij. 
The results are very similar, suggesting that the findings are robust to the choice of the 
bilateral index. The difference, as expected, is the opposite (positive) sign of the estimated 
coefficient, as now we are measuring similarity in GMO regulation. Yet, it is also worth 
noting that by using GMOwij the first stage Probit effect is, as expected, positive, but not 
significant. 
To put the estimates into perspective, and using our preferred specification (Column 
3 of Table 3), the magnitude of the estimated coefficient implies that a one standard 
deviation decrease in the GMO dissimilarity index (=0.188), which means an increase in 
regulatory closeness, increases exports of about 33%, all else remaining equal. This effect 
approximately corresponds to a change in GMOij from the value of France-Chile (=0.40) 
to that of France-Switzerland (=0.20). Thus the effect is not only statistically significant 
but appears also relevant from an economic point of view.  
                                                 
15
 In order to verify if the inclusion of intra-EU trade flow is driving the results, we also run regressions omitting them. 
Results are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar, confirming the robustness of our findings. 
16
 The over-dispersion test checks whether the negative binomial specification or the Poisson specification is preferred. 
The Vuong statistic tests if the zero-inflated model is favored rather the non-zero inflated one. 
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Table 4 investigates which GMO regulatory component matters the most considering 
both the probability of positive trade (extensive margin) and the volume of trade 
(intensive margin). In line with the results of Table 3, all GMO components exert a 
negative effect on the volume of trade, and most of them are statistically significant at 1% 
level, with the exclusion of international agreements that are barely significant, and the 
risk assessment that is not significant. Interestingly, considering the first stage Probit, and 
thus the probability to trade, only labeling and traceability significantly affect the 
extensive trade margin. This result may suggests that these components also act by raising 
fixed trade costs. 
Because regulatory components tend to be positively correlated, we also ran a 
specification that considers them simultaneously, in order to better disentangle their 
effect. Results are reported at the bottom of Table 4. Not surprisingly, their estimated 
coefficients decrease in absolute magnitude. However, the (theoretically) most important 
dimensions, namely labeling, approval process, and traceability, remain strongly 
significant. Because each component is normalized to vary from 0 to 1, the results suggest 
that labeling is the dimension most detrimental to trade, followed by the approval process 
and traceability. Given this ranking, it is not surprising that GMO labeling has been the 
major field of conflict across countries in terms of trade policies (Carrau, 2009).  
Table 5 investigates the sensitivity of different product groups to the GMOij index, 
running regressions for each group separately. The estimated coefficients on the GMOij 
are negative for all the groups, but are statistically significant only for corn, soybean and 
rapeseed, suggesting that these agricultural commodities are those most affected by GMO 
regulations. The importance of labeling, approval process and traceability are also 
confirmed for these three crops. Coexistence affects only maize and soybean, which are 
the two most cultivated GM crops worldwide and also the main imported GM products 
in the EU. Differently, we do not detect significant effects for cotton, possibly because 
only part of cotton products are considered. Probit regressions at the product level confirm 
that labeling and traceability are the most important regulatory components affecting the 
extensive margin of trade.  
Finally, Table 6 investigates the effects of the GMO regulations for different levels 
of development, interacting the GMOij index with three (exporting) dummies for 
developing, emerging and developed countries. Results show that the GMO regulations 
affect especially trade flows from developed countries and, to a lesser extent, from 
14 
 
emerging countries. The effect on developing countries’ trade is insignificant. Of course, 
this is not surprising given the structure of our dataset, where 94% of the exports come 
from emerging and developed countries.17  
In summary, our analysis suggests that cross-country differences in GMO standards 
significantly affect trade flows. These effects appear largely attributable to labeling, 
approval, and traceability standards, and are particularly relevant for corn and soybean 
products. Yet, the trade effect of GMO standards is especially relevant for trade flows 
from developed and emerging countries, but not from developing countries. The last 
result, however, should not be interpreted as a general indication that developing 
countries exports are not affected by GMO regulations. Indeed, developing countries are 
minor producers and exporters of the main GMO crops considered.  
 
4.1. Are GMO regulations endogenous to trade flows ? 
There are different potential sources of endogeneity in our model. We are especially 
concerned with endogeneity due to the potential simultaneity bias between GMO 
regulations and bilateral trade flows, for at least two reasons. First, a growing political 
economy literature on GMO regulation suggests that GMO standards are affected by the 
country’s trade position and comparative advantage (see Anderson and Jackson, 2004; 
Gruère et al. 2009a; Swinnen and Vandemoortele, 2011; Vigani and Olper, 2012). Thus, 
if import and regulation are not modeled to be simultaneously determined, the estimated 
impact of regulation on imports can be biased downward (see Trefler, 1993). Second, 
empirical evidence and conceptual models suggest that developing countries have set 
GMO standards taking into account the trade-off between agronomic advantage and loss 
of market access, in countries where consumers have strong concerns on GMOs (Tothova 
and Oehmke, 2004; Veyssiere, 2007; Gruère et al. 2009a).  
Addressing simultaneity in the gravity model is difficult because of the lack of good 
instruments. In fact, almost all the potential determinants of GMO regulations exert an 
effect on bilateral trade flows, thus they tend to be weak instruments (see Baier and 
Bergstrand, 2007). Previous attempts to deal with this kind of endogeneity in gravity 
                                                 
17
 Specifically, exports from developed countries represent 63% of observations and 54% of the total 
exports value. Exports from emerging countries are 31% of observations and 45% of exports value. Exports 
from developing countries are only 6% of the observations, and around 1% of the total value of the exports 
in the sample. 
15 
 
models have followed the approach of Lee and Swagel (1997) and Trefler (1993), who 
used industrial conditions as an instrument for trade policy (see Shepherd, 2007; Olper 
and Raimondi, 2008). However, when working at the HS 6-digit level, it is impossible to 
adopt this strategy due to data constraints. An alternative strategy, followed in this paper, 
is the one proposed by Djankov et al. (2010), who deals with the potential endogeneity 
of the time to ship goods in a gravity model, using the trade times of neighboring countries 
as instrument. The intuition is that while trade flows may affect domestic trade times, 
they are less likely to affect times abroad. Following a similar logic, we instrument the 
GMO index by using the weighted average GMO indices of the five closest neighbors, 
using the distance between capitals as a weight.  
The results of this exercise are shown in Table 7. Columns (1) and (2) report a 
benchmark OLS and the corresponding IV regression, respectively. We start from these 
regressions because, as it is well known, an instrumental variable approach can also be 
used to deal with selection bias problems (see Wooldridge 2002). Interestingly, passing 
from the OLS to the IV estimator, the coefficient of the GMOij increases in magnitude 
from -1.18 to -2.26, and remains strongly significant.18 This result means that when the 
distance in GMO regulations is modeled endogenously, its estimated coefficient is 
approximately two times larger the size obtained from treating it exogenously, as the 
theory of endogenous trade policy predicts.  
A formal test for this conclusion is reported at the bottom of the table. The Hausman 
endogeneity test rejects at the 1% level the hypothesis that the GMOij index can be treated 
as exogenous. Moreover, the Cragg-Donald under-identification test is also strongly 
significant, rejecting the hypothesis of weak identification in the first stage regression 
(not shown). 
Columns 3 and 4 give further support to these results. Indeed, by running a IV second 
stage Heckman regression, the coefficient of GMOij once again significantly increases 
and, as expected, it has an order of magnitude similar to the one obtained without the 
Heckman selection correction.19  
                                                 
18
 Using the GMOwij instead of GMOij, the results are qualitatively similar, although the magnitude of the 
increase in the IV regression is higher.  
19
 See Wooldridge (2002) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007) for a similar estimator. Basically it represents 
a three step estimator. The first stage is the estimation of the predicted probabilities of trade, through a 
Probit equation. The second stage is a linear regression of GMOij on a constant, the Mills ratio from the 
first stage, including all the covariates of the first stage plus the instrument. The third stage is the estimation 
of the gravity equation substituting the predicted values from the second-stage regression for GMOij.  
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Keeping in mind the usual caveats about instruments, these results appear interesting 
for several reasons. First, they strongly confirm the results of the previous section on the 
positive effect of GMO standards harmonization on international trade. Second, they 
confirm that the GMO regulation is endogenous to trade flows, and this is in line with the 
idea that governments take into account the country trade position in deciding on GMO 
regulation. Finally, using regression from Column 4 of Table 7, the magnitude of the 
estimated IV coefficient implies that a one standard deviation decrease in the GMO 
dissimilarity index (=0.161), increases exports of about 53%, ceteris paribus. This means 
that, using the effect of the GMO regulation when treated exogenously as a lower bound, 
the increase of trade due to the harmonization ranges between 33% to 53%. It is worth 
noting that this effect is of the same order of magnitude of a full liberalization trade effect 
in the agro-food sector.20  
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
Motivated by the complex pattern and evolution of GMO regulations in the last decade, 
this paper quantifies the effect of GMO regulations on bilateral trade flows at the global 
level. A composite index of such regulations, as well as a score for six GMO regulatory 
dimensions, was developed for sixty countries. In a second step, we use a gravity model 
to analyze how bilateral similarity/dissimilarity in GMO regulations affects trade flows 
for the composite index and its components. There are three main results.  
First, countries that have strong differences in their GMO regulations trade 
significantly less. Thus, what matter for trade flows is the level of harmonization in GMO 
standards between countries, a result in line with the recent evidence related to other 
industries (see Czubala et al. 2009; Shepherd, 2007). Second, the regulatory dimension 
that matters the most is labeling, followed by the approval process and traceability. Not 
surprisingly, coexistence appears less important from the point of view of trade as it is 
more related to the field production stage. Third, all these effects are particularly strong 
for developed and emerging countries. Finally, we found that the endogeneity of GMO 
regulation to trade flows is potentially important. Taking into account endogeneity, the 
magnitude of the estimated GMO regulatory effect increases by a factor of 2.  
                                                 
20
 Hertel and Keeney (2006) using GTAP, found that agricultural and food trade increased of 21% when all 
tariffs and agricultural subsidies were removed. Similarly, Raimondi and Olper (2011), using a gravity 
model showed that current trade barriers (tariffs) reduce food industry global trade of 33%. 
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The main policy implication of this study is that a process of global harmonization of 
GMO standards would have a large positive trade effect, and this is especially true with 
regard to labeling policies.  
18 
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Figure 1. GMO regulatory index score and ranking 
 
Notes: Mean = 0.50; Standard Deviation = 0.226 
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Table 1. Categories, conditions and scores of the GMO regulatory index 
  
Note: see text. 
 
 
  
1.     Approval process Score
Absence of GMO approval procedures 0
Mandatory approval process but  far from enforcement 1
Mandatory approval process adopting the principle of substantial equivalence 2
Mandatory approval process adopting the precautionary principle 3
GM-free country 4
2.     Risk assessment Score
Absence of GMO risk analysis 0
Proposed risk assessment but  far from enforcement 1
Mandatory risk assessment 2
GM-free country 3
3.     Labeling policies Score
Absence of labeling policies 0
Voluntary GMO labeling 1
Mandatory GMO label with threshold  >1% 2
Mandatory GMO label with threshold  <= 1% 3
GM-free country 4
4.     Traceability requirements Score
Absence of GMO traceability or an IP 0
GMO traceability far from enforcement or is in place IP 1
Mandatory GMO traceability 2
GM-free country 3
5.     Coexistence guidelines Score
Absence of coexistence rules 0
GMO coexistence policies far from enforcement 1
Partial guidelines on coexistence 2
Exhaustive guidelines on coexistence 3
GM-free country 4
6.     Membership in international agreements Score
No adherence to international agreements 0
Adherence to a single international agreement 1
Adherence to both international agreements 2
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Table 2. Summary statistics of variables used in the gravity equation 
 
Notes: because the GMO regulatory index does not vary across products, the number of observations 
refer only to 60*59 = 3540 bilateral countries observations. Observations related to Ln Import refer only 
to positive trade. See text for variables explanation. 
 
 
Variables No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GMOw ij  Similarity Index 3540 0.815 0.148 0 1
GMO ij  Dissimilarity Index 3540 0.258 0.188 0 0.90
GMO ij  Diss. Components 3540 0 1.00
   Labeling 3540 0.327 0.287 0 1
   Approval 3540 0.291 0.283 0 1
   Traceability 3540 0.352 0.321 0 1
   Risk assessment 3540 0.141 0.209 0 1
   Coexistence 3540 0.319 0.313 0 1
   Agreements 3540 0.223 0.302 0 1
GMO ij  5 closest neighbours 3540 0.213 0.161 0 1
Ln Import ijk 17112 3.208 3.392 -6.91 15.031
Ln Distance ij 91253 8.659 0.938 5.08 9.880
Contiguity 91253 0.042 0.200 0 1
Language 91253 0.105 0.306 0 1
Colony 91253 0.026 0.159 0 1
Ln (1 +  tariff ijk) 91253 0.057 0.163 0 1.950
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Table 3. GMO regulation and trade: regression results. 
 
Notes: In parentheses robust standard errors clustered within importing-exporting countries. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Each regression includes fixed effects for 
importers, exporters and HS 2-digit products. In the ZINB regressions of column (4) and (8), the over-
dispersion test (alpha  value) is 18.36 and 18.33 respectively, both significant at 1%; differently, for the 
Vuong Test the z-score is 32.23 and 32.42, respectively. 
 
 
Probit II stage OLS Probit II stage OLS
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GMO ij  Index -1.18*** -0.24*** -1.53*** -0.94***
(0.19) (0.07) (0.19) (0.26)
GMOw ij  Index 1.65*** 0.11 1.93*** 1.21**
(0.36) (0.13) (0.35) (0.50)
Ln Distance ij -0.80*** -0.65*** -1.65*** -2.10*** -0.85*** -0.67*** -1.73*** -2.14***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07)
Contiguity 0.98*** 0.47*** 1.30*** 1.15*** 0.96*** 0.46*** 1.27*** 1.13***
(0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.19) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.19)
Language 0.11 0.22*** 0.19 0.11 0.23*** 0.16
(0.08) (0.04) (0.15) (0.08) (0.04) (0.15)
Colony -0.11 0.22*** 0.36*** 0.36** -0.15 0.21*** 0.30*** 0.38**
(0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.18) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.18)
Ln (1 +  tariff ij ) -1.57*** -0.33*** -1.88*** -1.05*** -1.61*** -0.35*** -1.95*** -1.05***
(0.20) (0.06) (0.20) (0.39) (0.20) (0.06) (0.20) (0.39)
Mills ratio 2.19*** 2.20***
(0.14) (0.14)
Constant 5.85*** 4.18*** 10.40*** 20.38*** 4.64*** 4.84*** 5.95*** -8.01***
(0.62) (0.19) (0.79) (0.83) (0.70) (0.24) (0.67) (0.37)
Observations 17112 91253 17112 91253 17112 91253 17112 91253
FE Importer, exporter and HS2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Heckman procedureHeckman procedure
OLS ZINB OLS ZINB
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Table 4. GMO regulation and trade: regressions at regulatory components level 
 
Notes: In parentheses robust standard errors clustered within importing-exporting country. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Figures refer to the first (Probit) and second 
(OLS) stage of the Heckman regression. Each regression includes all the controls of Table 3, plus country 
fixed effects for importers, exporters, and HS 2-digit products. The total number of observations does not 
add up to 17,112 (as Column 1 of Table 3) because in the estimation of the first stage Probit equation for 
each product group, we lose observations due to zero imports of some products for some countries (i.e. 
Indonesia and Ukraine and corn imports). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Probit (1) -0.16*** (0.05)
II st.OLS (2) -0.80*** (0.13) 2.19*** (0.14)
Probit (3) -0.05 (0.05)
II st.OLS (4) -0.76*** (0.16) 2.20*** (0.14)
Probit (5) -0.12*** (0.04)
II st.OLS (6) -0.52*** (0.10) 2.17*** (0.14)
Probit (7) 0.08 (0.17)
II st.OLS (8) -0.50 (0.49) 2.18*** (0.14)
Probit (9) -0.04 (0.04)
II st.OLS (10) -0.31*** (0.08) 2.19*** (0.14)
Probit (11) 0.01 (0.05)
II st.OLS (12) -0.21* (0.12) 2.18*** (0.14)
Probit (13) -0.13** (0.05) 0.03 (0.06) -0.10** (0.04) 0.13 (0.17) 0.01 (0.04) 0.04 (0.05)
II st.OLS (14) -0.54*** (0.14) -0.36** (0.17) -0.29*** (0.11) -0.02 (0.49) -0.14 (0.09) -0.05 (0.12) 2.18*** (0.14)
GMO ij  Dissimilarity Index Components
Mills ratio   Labeling    Approval    Traceability    Risk    Coexistence    Agreements
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Table 5. GMO regulation and trade: regressions at regulatory components and product 
group level 
 
Notes: In parentheses robust standard errors clustered within importing-exporting country. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Figures refer to the first (Probit) and second 
(OLS) stage of the Heckman regression. Each regression includes all the controls of Table 3, plus country 
fixed effects for importer, exporter, and HS 2-digit products.  
 
GMOij Index Probit II st.OLS Probit II st.OLS Probit II st.OLS Probit II st.OLS
   Labeling -0.10* -0.66*** -0.26*** -1.19*** -0.31*** -1.41*** -0.27* -0.23
(0.06) (0.16) (0.08) (0.26) (0.10) (0.41) (0.15) (0.90)
   Approval 0.07 -0.66*** -0.14 -1.16*** -0.22 -1.46** -0.40** -1.45
(0.06) (0.20) (0.09) (0.33) (0.15) (0.68) (0.20) (1.14)
   Traceability -0.13*** -0.49*** -0.12** -0.79*** -0.27*** -1.08*** -0.07 -0.21
(0.04) (0.13) (0.06) (0.18) (0.08) (0.33) (0.14) (0.81)
   Risk 0.35* 0.04 -0.11 0.27 -0.51 -2.75* -0.16 -1.15
(0.20) (0.58) (0.24) (1.04) (0.45) (1.56) (0.53) (3.22)
   Coexistence -0.03 -0.32*** -0.08 -0.46*** -0.02 -0.09 0.09 1.08
(0.05) (0.11) (0.07) (0.18) (0.07) (0.23) (0.17) (1.06)
   Agreements -0.05 -0.47*** 0.08 -0.34 -0.11 0.14 0.08 0.70
(0.06) (0.15) (0.09) (0.24) (0.10) (0.40) (0.15) (0.76)
Observations 45345 8236 17759 3983 17164 2119 5508 316
Maize Soybean Rapeseed Cotton
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Table 6. GMO regulation and trade: different levels of development 
 
Notes: In parentheses robust standard errors clustered within importing-exporting country. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Figures refer to the first (Probit) and second 
(OLS) stage of the Heckman regression. Each regression includes country fixed effects for importer, 
exporter, and HS 2-digit products.  
 
  
Probit II stage OLS
GMO ij * Developing 0.85 0.07 0.56
(0.57) (0.20) (0.57)
GMO ij * Emerging -0.61* -0.02 -0.88**
(0.36) (0.12) (0.36)
GMO ij * Developed -1.71*** -0.45*** -2.13***
(0.22) (0.08) (0.22)
Ln Distance ij -0.79*** -0.65*** -1.63***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.06)
Contiguity 0.98*** 0.47*** 1.29***
(0.09) (0.07) (0.09)
Language 0.09 0.22***
(0.08) (0.04)
Colony -0.09 0.23*** 0.37***
(0.10) (0.06) (0.10)
Ln (1 +  tariff ij ) -1.56*** -0.33*** -1.86***
(0.20) (0.06) (0.20)
Mills ratio 2.15***
(0.14)
Constant 7.83*** 4.58*** 9.48***
(0.80) (0.18) (0.82)
Observations 17112 91253 17112
FE Importer, exporter and HS 2-digit Yes Yes Yes
Variables OLS
Heckman procedure
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Table 7. GMO regulation and trade: IV regressions  
 
Notes: In parentheses robust standard error clustered within importing-exporting country. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. In the IV regressions the GMOij index is 
instrumented with the weighted average index of the five closer neighbor countries (see text). The Cragg-
Donald under-identification test tests the null hypothesis that the first stage is weakly identified. The critical 
value for rejection of the hypothesis of weak identification is 16.38 (10% level) as reported in Stock and 
Yogo (2002). The Hausman endogeneity test tests the null hypothesis that the endogenous variable can be 
treated as exogenous. Each regression includes fixed effects for importers, exporters, and HS 2-digit 
products. 
 
  
Variables II stage OLS II stage IV
GMOij Index -1.18*** -2.26*** -1.53*** -2.63***
(0.19) (0.38) (0.19) (0.38)
Ln Distance ij -0.80*** -0.71*** -1.65*** -1.56***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Contiguity 0.98*** 1.02*** 1.30*** 1.33***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Language 0.11 0.08
(0.08) (0.08)
Colony -0.11 -0.03 0.36*** 0.43***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Ln (1 +  tariff ij ) -1.57*** -1.46*** -1.88*** -1.78***
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Mills ratio 2.19*** 2.18***
(0.14) (0.14)
Constant 8.64*** 8.71*** 10.40*** 10.59***
(0.77) (0.78) (0.79) (0.80)
Observations 17112 17112 17112 17113
FE Impoerter, exporter and HS2 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cragg-Donald underid. test
p-value
Hausman endogeneity test
p-value
Heckman procedure
9.91
0.002
5145.08
0.000
OLS IV
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Web-appendix A.1. GMO index regulatory components 
In this online appendix, we provide a full description of the characteristics and economic impact 
of each regulatory dimension composing the GMO index used in the empirical analysis.  
As a general rule, a more restrictive regulatory component would increase production and 
compliance costs due to comprehensive requirements, and would consequently have a greater 
effect on trade. We assigned higher scores to more restrictive requirements. Table 1 shows the 
list of regulatory components and sub-dimensions. 
Approval process 
The first condition that allows any possible handling of a GMO product in a country is its approval 
status. GM ingredients or foods need specific approval procedures for import and cultivation. 
These procedures test the safety of GM products. In contrast with other requirements (e.g. 
traceability and labeling), which act similarly to other trade standards, approval is a measure that 
directly affects market access: if a GM event is not approved it is not possible to introduce it into 
the country.  
Approval process requirements vary significantly across countries. There are two main groups 
of countries that share similar approaches. One group follows the EU regulation based on the 
‘precautionary principle’. It means that any product produced with, or derived from, transgenic 
crops is subject to GM regulation and the consumer ‘right to know’. The second group follows 
the US ‘substantial equivalence’ approach, that exempts essentially equivalent products from any 
specific requirement (Gruère, 2006). Between the two there are other different approaches to the 
approval process.  
We defined five levels of restrictiveness (from 0 to 4) for an approval process. The levels are 
based on the degree of domestic implementation of the regulation. A score of 0 is assigned if there 
are no constraints on GMO cultivation and marketing; 1 if there exists a mandatory approval 
process established at legislative level, but not yet implemented; 2 if the mandatory approval 
process follows the principle of substantial equivalence; 3 if the mandatory approval process 
follows the precautionary principle; and finally, 4 for GM-free countries (prohibition of 
cultivation and marketing). 
Most EU members, Japan and fast-growing income countries like China and India are scored 
in the third condition, which is the most comprehensive. The zero or first condition includes 
developing or emerging countries that take the so called ‘wait and see’ position. 
Risk assessment 
Assessments are based on the biological characteristics of the new organism, and test the safety 
of food and feed containing GMOs and the effects on the environment. The typology of the testing 
depends on the country’s approach, whether based on substantial equivalent or precautionary 
principle. In many cases the exporter is the legal subject responsible for the assessment. 
Risk assessment is the target for international harmonization efforts for shared methodologies, 
though still at discussion stage. The scheduling and realization of programs for field trials is 
expensive and some countries (e.g. developing countries) are not able to deal with these costs. 
We identified four levels (range 0-3) for risk assessment regulation. The two extreme 
conditions, scored 0 and 3, indicate a lack in the risk assessment framework, but the difference is 
substantial: a score of 0 (e.g. Ukraine) indicates a normative void that does not affect trade or 
cultivation as there are no standards; score 3, on the contrary, applies to GM-free countries, hence 
totally opposed to the importation (and cultivation) of GMOs and imposing the strongest degree 
of restrictiveness. Between these two scores, we assign 1 if the risk assessment is at proposal 
stage, and 2 if risk assessment is compulsory. 
Labeling policies 
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In 1997, the EU introduced GMO labeling with the purpose of guaranteeing the consumer’s ‘right 
to know’. Labels carry indications of the presence of GM ingredients, but also of health safety 
and product diversification. Labeling has also met environmental issues, playing a major role in 
consumption decisions of consumers concerned with environmental pollution associated with GM 
products (Appleton, 2000). A label can act as an hazard warning, affecting the demand for GM 
and non-GM products (Gruère, 2006). 
A labeling regime is expected to affect trade flows, in particular the trade of the biggest 
suppliers of GM crops (Gruère and Rao, 2007; Gruère et al. 2009b). Costs caused by a label 
depend on: the threshold level, the capacity of the public authorities to enforce labeling 
requirements, and the capacity of industry to comply with labeling rules. GM labels have effects 
on the whole agri-food chain. Actors have to collect and handle information concerning the 
presence of GM ingredients until the final consumer. The transfer of this information adds onerous 
management costs. Ultimately, labeling indirectly affects trade through the imposition of 
implementation costs, carried by exporters. 
Among countries we registered two main approaches: voluntary and mandatory labeling. 
Mandatory labeling requirements are divided into further two groups: label on the finished 
product (Australia and Japan), and on GM technology as a production process (EU and China). 
In the former case, the quantification of GM ingredients is required to be labeled, and, usually, 
the threshold is higher. In the latter case any product derived from GM crops has to be reported. 
In this case, thresholds are more restrictive.  
We have identified five categories of labeling, based on threshold. Compliance with a 
restrictive threshold implies an increase in production and commercialization costs. We assigned 
a 0 score in absence of labeling requirements; 1 with voluntary regime; 2 in the presence of a 
mandatory regime with a threshold higher than 1%; 3 with mandatory regime with a threshold 
equal or lower than 1%; finally, 4 in GM-free countries. 
Traceability requirements 
Traceability is an instrument to create a network to ‘retrace history, use or location of an entity 
by means of recorded identification’, and to guarantee efficient withdrawal from the food and 
feed market if any unexpected effect occurs to health and environment. In the case of GMO 
products, the traceability system is based on identity preservation (IP) for the diversification 
between different productions, ensuring to the consumer the origin and the characteristics of the 
product. Moreover, producers, processors and retailers have to collect, retain and transmit 
information at each stage of the agri-food chain (Bailey, 2002). 
Countries with a comprehensive traceability regulation must create procedures for the 
identification of industry chain participants who supply and demand products. Agents of the food 
chain must transmit information on the identity of the product and whether it contains GMOs, and 
must retain the information for a period of time (post-market monitoring), i.e. 5 years. Moreover 
they must guarantee information availability for applicants (Wilson et al., 2008). 
At the producer level, farmers have to be certain of the absence of cross-pollination between 
neighboring crops, and must comply with certified storage and harvesting. Elevators, processors 
and retailers must keep information on product identity and transmit this information by lot 
numbers and test results. 
All these requirements induce increasing costs, but also benefit the market niche gains. Cost 
increase is difficult to establish because traceability is an issue with long term implications, 
whereas variable costs depend on crops e.g. soybean and maize provide a great number of 
byproducts in different agri-food industries. Moreover, liability and compensation schemes are 
crucial. The main costs are due to certification, record collection and information keeping, and 
are carried by GMO producers and supplier countries, with a potentially higher final market price 
for both GMO and GM-free products.  
For the traceability category we defined the following scores: 0 if the regulation does not 
require traceability or IP; 1 if traceability is at proposal stage or if IP is enforced; 2 if traceability 
is mandatory; and 3 if the country is GM-free. 
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Coexistence guidelines 
The purpose of coexistence is to guarantee consumers and farmers the possibility of choosing 
what to consume or produce among GM, traditional and organic products. This is feasible only if 
there is IP among crops, which must be segregated in space and time. Coexistence procedures 
require mechanisms preventing pollen flows (such as distances or pollen barriers between fields 
of GM, traditional and organic products), refuge areas and dedicated machineries, but also 
compensation and liability systems. It also requires strong cooperation between farmers in close 
proximity. 
Production costs rise due to isolation, monitoring, purity testing, dedicated equipment and/or 
its cleaning. Costs may vary at different purity levels, taking into account that zero threshold of 
transgene in GM-free crops is not feasible in some agricultural systems. Some policy makers in 
developing countries assume that coexistence is not feasible or can be done only by facing 
prohibitive costs. 
Because of the difficulties in establishing coexistence strategies, the level of implementation 
of coexistence policies varies widely across countries, and in several cases requirements are not 
stated clearly. For this reason we decided to score 0 those countries without any coexistence rule; 
1 if coexistence policies are still far from enforcement; 2 if there are partial guidelines; 3 if 
exhaustive coexistence guidelines are adopted; and 4 if the country is GM-free. 
Membership in international GMO related agreements 
The purpose of the Codex Alimentarius is to define standards for consumer protection, and 
to promote fair relationship in international trade practices. It successfully reached an agreement 
on safety assessment procedures for GMOs, but no formal labeling standards were adopted. 
The aim of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (BSP), which is part of the United Nations 
Convention on Biodiversity, is to introduce a shared procedure for risk assessment, risk 
management and trans-boundary movements of Living Modified Organisms (LMOs). The BSP 
acts between importer and exporter, introducing an Advanced Informed Agreement (AIA) for the 
intentional introduction of LMOs into the environment. In particular, it requires a comprehensive 
risk assessment and risk management framework provided by the exporter before the first 
introduction of a LMO into the importer territory. Rules from the BSP are on bundling, transport, 
packaging and identification during any LMO trans-boundary movement.  
The compliance with the BSP can impose higher production and marketing costs, on both 
GM and non-GM products, because of the creation of domestic structures for annual testing.  
If the country does not adhere to either one of the two international agreements, the score is 
0; otherwise the score is 1 or 2 when the country subscribes to one or both agreements. 
It is important to note that, until the Codex Alimentarius reaches agreement on GMO labeling, 
and the BSP comes actively into force in all member countries, neither international institution 
will influence trade flows. However, we decided to consider also this category on the grounds 
that the expected future enforcement will have a trade effect. 
 
 
 
